

*File "Ames to DCI"*

21 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : PB/NSC Coordinator

SUBJECT : DCI Testimony before SSCI and Senate Budget Committee (U)

1. You are scheduled for the following appearances:
  - a. SSCI: Monday, 25 February, 1400-1700
  - b. Senate Budget Committee: Tuesday, 26 February, 1400-1700 (U)
2. Approach. Your Worldwide Wrap-up, as previously given to the HASC and HAC Defense Subcommittee, has been modified in two ways:
  - a. It has been updated.
  - b. Certain additions have been made which are tailored to specific Committee interests. (Most of these additions are in response to Budget Committee questions and these have been noted by a blue line in the right hand margin. You may want to skip these sections when briefing the SSCI. There is one section--the last part of the Overview --which pertains to the SSCI only, and this has been noted by a green line in the right hand margin.)

It is felt that this would be the simplest, most direct way to prepare for two different Committee hearings on successive days. (U)

3. Backup. Both of these hearings are, by comparison with your previous appearances, for only a relatively short time (2-3 hours), and no second day has been scheduled. Therefore it is planned that only [redacted] and Bob Ames will accompany you. [redacted] will also go along and I believe [redacted] will accompany you for Tuesday's appearance before the Budget Committee.) Concur  
Non-concur (U)

4. Background. We have had both correspondence from these Committees and some personal discussion with staffers.

a. Re SSCI:

- Attached at TAB A is a copy of the letter from the Committee. This letter describes both the intent of Monday's overview session and Wednesday's NFIP presentation before the Budget Subcommittee.
- The letter notes three points to be addressed at the overview session: key trends; their significance; and implications for investment.

- On the first two, your Overview and the Soviet, Strategic, GPF and Middle East briefings should suffice.

- With respect to the last item, after talking with RMS, it was decided to address the point briefly in the Overview (this is the last section). RMS felt that if any further elaboration was made it would get into the arena of your budget presentation.

- As in the case of your previous Committee appearances, OLC has met with SSCI staffers Miller and Eisenhower to discuss your intentions at the hearing. They were also provided a courtesy copy of your draft Overview to share with the Co-Chairmen only.

b. Re Budget Committee:

- Attached at TAB B is the letter from Senator Muskie requesting your appearance and specifying certain items of interest.

- Since this briefing is a first, not only for this Committee, but also for many members who are not on any other major Committee we brief, we got together personally with the two key staffers: John Tillson, majority staffer, formerly of OSD/PA&E where he wrote Defense Guidance; and Bob Helms, staffer to Senator Bellmon.

- The request for your appearance was generated by Senator Bellmon's interest in having some benchmark against which to measure the Defense budget.

- Tillson has subsequently become involved in a major way by trying to get a DoD-type Soviet Threat brief; but, since he doesn't trust DoD, he wanted such an assessment by the DCI. His thrust is clear when you read the questions in Senator Muskie's letter.

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- Based on our meeting, however, he agreed to our approach, understanding that we would address his concerns in your briefing. This has been done, and those parts that have been specifically added for the Budget Committee are marked in blue in the right hand margin.
- Attached at TAB C is an additional list of questions that Tillson provided us today. Again you can see where his focus is (some of these questions, if asked, are more in the policy arena).
- Basically, most of the answers to their concerns are addressed in the briefings as modified.
- However, tomorrow night we will forward to you for review a complete set of Qs and As for both TABs B and C. (C/NF)

5. Miscellaneous.

- a. We learned that General Rogers, in briefing the SASC the other day commented on the fact that the USSR had surpassed the West in all types of conventional and nuclear weapons. He further noted that they had outproduced NATO 2-3:1 in most major weapons over the last 15 years.  
  - Two members of the Budget Committee, Gary Hart and Janus Exxon, and two members of the SSCI, Scoop Jackson and Barry Goldwater, are on the SASC.
  - We are therefore trying to get copies of his testimony and will have [ ] prepare answers in anticipation of any questions. (This will be provided tomorrow also.)
- b. The Senate Budget Committee does not plan on having any briefings by DIA; however, you are only one witness in a series who will address the world situation and especially the Soviets. On Tuesday morning, before your testimony, they will hold an open hearing with George Kennan and Richard Pipes. [ ] will attend this session to be better prepared for anything you might be hit with as a result of the Kennan/Pipes testimony.
- c. Re Strategic Briefing: Immediately following the briefing which you have given before (with certain revisions to address Budget Committee questions) is a rewrite of the last 4 pages. This rewrite represents a substantive change to what you have briefed before--it is based on recent changes made to 11-3/8. New rough graphics which would have to be made to accompany this version are also attached.

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- Use basic briefing \_\_\_\_\_
- Use revised briefing and new graphics ✓

d. Notations have been made on the graphics as to which are being revised. Also, each of the briefings has been underlined and bracketed in red just as you had before. (C/NF)

6. I think that, on balance, you can go with the revised briefings as you have in the past. You don't have much time and there is no need to give a distinctly different briefing to each Committee. Between the material in the briefings and the preparation done by the NIOs based on information received you should be in good shape to say what you want and still address their concerns/questions. (U)



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Attachments

*Worried about time -  
Need to work down to  
most applicable 40 min  
for Budget Comm &  
about 1 1/2 hrs total for  
SSCI*

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TAB B

EDWARD S. MUSKIE, MAINE, CHAIRMAN  
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, WASH.  
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, S.C.  
LAWTON CHILES, FLA.  
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.  
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DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, N.Y.  
J. JAMES EXON, NEBR.

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# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry  
76-3257

JOHN T. MC EVOY, STAFF DIRECTOR  
ROBERT S. BOYD, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

January 29, 1980

0786-80

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

I'm looking forward to your testimony before the Senate Budget Committee on Tuesday, February 26. We are particularly anxious to hear your personal views on the impact of the threats facing the United States on U.S. defense needs and priorities since your testimony will provide the background for our review of the defense budget request.

The Committee will be interested in several lines of inquiry and I want to take this opportunity to inform you of them in advance. I would appreciate it if you would be prepared to address each of these issues in your statement. Since we are always pressed for time and want to keep as much time as possible for dialogue between you and the Committee Members, I would appreciate it if you would limit your introductory remarks to no more than fifteen minutes.

The following issues will be of particular interest to the Committee:

1. What are the Soviet goals in Afghanistan and in the area of the Middle East and South Asia as a whole? What priorities do the Soviets assign to these goals? What circumstances could lead the Soviets to employ military force against Pakistan or Iran? How do the Soviets view U.S. forces in the area?
2. What events or conditions could lead the Soviets to initiate a war in the third world, with NATO using conventional or theater nuclear forces, or with the United States using strategic nuclear forces? How do the Soviets think a war with the United States might start? Under what conditions would the Soviets consider making a "bolt out of the blue" attack on U.S. strategic nuclear forces? How would you characterize Soviet willingness to take steps that risk war with the United States? Do Soviet military and political leaders express the same views on these issues?
3. If SALT II fails to be ratified, do you expect the Soviets to make a major increase in their strategic nuclear forces? What kind of improvements are likely? What constraints are there

to these improvements?

4. What considerations have prompted the continued Soviet arms build-up in recent years? What do the Soviets consider to be the major threats facing them? In what order of danger do they view these threats?

5. How do the Soviets perceive U.S. intentions and capabilities? What is their view of the capabilities of our strategic nuclear forces? Do they fear a U.S. first strike? What is their view of the role of U.S. general purpose forces and theater nuclear forces in Europe? What is their likely response to our decision to increase defense spending by 5%?

6. What missions and what priorities do the Soviets assign to their ground forces, their air forces, and their naval forces? In particular, what priority do they assign to attacking the sea lines of communication between the United States and NATO during a NATO war? What priority would they assign to naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific?

7. How do NATO and Warsaw Pact defense spending levels compare? Please provide comparisons of NATO and Warsaw Pact spending for intercontinental strategic nuclear offensive forces, for ground forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces, and for Research and Development.

If there are questions about your appearance, please have your staff contact Mr. John Tillson, 224-0553 or Mr. Bob Sneed, 224-9284 of the Budget Committee staff.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'E. Muskie', written over a horizontal line.

Edmund S. Muskie

<b>SPEED LETTER</b>	REPLY REQUESTED		DATE 21 February 1980
	YES	NO	LETTER NO.
TO : Deputy Legislative Counsel	FROM: <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 1.2em; vertical-align: middle;"></span>		
ATTN:			

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I saw John Tillson this morning and he gave me a list of questions which are likely to be asked the DCI when he appears before the Senate Committee on Budget on 26 February (Attached). I will be passing a copy to  also.

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I also ran into Bob Helm. He passed me word that Senator Hatch (R., UT) plans to ask whether or not the trend of spending on Covert Action is going up or down. When I noted the Senator might be told by the DCI that he cannot discuss such subjects, Bob replied that he personally was interested only in letting me know such a question would be put to the DCI and not in the DCI's response. I thanked him for the "head's up".

I also discussed the time the DCI might allot to his opening statement and there was agreement between Bob and John that 40 minutes seems about the right amount.

(Comment: I note the questions, which will be passed out to the Majority Senators, deal almost exclusively with the Soviets.)

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3X1A cc:

SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE



QUESTIONS FOR SOVIET HEARINGS

26 February 1980

Issue I: The Soviet View of Their Role in the World

WHAT IS THE LIKELY SOVIET RESPONSE TO A U.S. DECISION TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING BY 5 PERCENT? 2  
0

WHAT IS THEIR LIKELY RESPONSE TO A U.S. DECISION TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING BY 10 PERCENT, OR MORE?

HOW SHOULD U.S. POLICY BE CHANGED TO RECOGNIZE THE REALITY OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUALITY? MUST WE REGAIN SUPERIORITY? WILL THE SOVIETS ALLOW US TO REGAIN SUPERIORITY? No Comment  
7

WHAT MILITARY STEPS WOULD YOU TAKE IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN? No Comment

WHERE IN THE WORLD WOULD YOU EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO TAKE MILITARY INITIATIVES IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS? HOW CAN THESE STEPS BE DETERRED? 2  
0

Issue II: Soviet Goals in the Persian Gulf and the Third World

WHAT EVENTS, CONCERNS AND OBJECTIVES LED TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN? WHAT IMPACT MIGHT SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT CHINA HAVE HAD IN THE SOVIET DECISION TO INVADE? 2  
0

WHAT SHOULD THE U. S. DO TO FORCE THE SOVIETS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN? N.C.  
*But what could...* - OK

WHAT ARE THE SOVIET GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA AS A WHOLE, AND WHAT PRIORITY DO THE SOVIETS ASSIGN TO THESE GOALS IN LIGHT OF THEIR OTHER FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AROUND THE WORLD?

WHAT CAN THE U. S. DO TO DETER A SOVIET MILITARY MOVE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD?

WILL THE PRESIDENT'S PLEDGE TO USE U.S. FORCES TO PROTECT U. S. INTERESTS ACTUALLY DETER THE SOVIETS?

WHAT CAN THE U. S. DO TO DETER A SOVIET MILITARY MOVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE AFGHAN REBELS?

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WHAT STEPS WOULD YOU EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO TAKE TO REACH THEIR GOALS IN THIS AREA?

WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD LEAD THE SOVIETS TO EMPLOY MILITARY FORCE AGAINST PAKISTAN OR IRAN?

WOULD U. S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY HAVE DETERRED THE SOVIETS FROM THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN?

For Admiral Turner only:

*I'd like more detail on which forces were mobilized, etc*  
IN THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN THE SOVIETS USED FORCES THAT ARE NORMALLY DEPLOYED ALONG THE AFGHAN BORDER. THESE ARE THE SAME KINDS OF FORCES THAT WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN A MAJOR SOVIET SURPRISE ATTACK OF IRAN. HAVE THESE FORCES DEMONSTRATED THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT THE KIND OF MAJOR OPERATION THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN AN ATTACK TO SEIZE THE PERSIAN GULF OIL FIELDS?

*?? =*  
*Need for detail*  
HOW LONG WOULD YOU ESTIMATE THAT IT WOULD TAKE THE SOVIET UNION TO MOVE FORCES FROM THE IRANIAN BORDER TO THE OIL FIELDS NEAR THE PERSIAN GULF WITHOUT ANY U. S. OPPOSITION? HOW MUCH WOULD YOU EXPECT U. S. TACTICAL AIR AND B-52 CONVENTIONAL STRIKES WOULD BE ABLE TO DELAY THOSE SOVIET MOVEMENT TIMES?

WHAT THREAT DO SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN POSE TO THE FORCES WE CURRENTLY HAVE DEPLOYED THERE?

### Issue III: The Soviet Arms Buildup

WHY HAVE THE SOVIETS MADE SUCH A MAJOR ARMS BUILDUP IN RECENT YEARS?

*?*  
NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, DO YOU EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO CONTINUE THEIR BUILDUP IN LIGHT OF THE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS THEY FACE? HOW WILL U. S. BEHAVIOR AFFECT THEIR ACTIONS?

*??*  
WHAT DO THE SOVIETS CONSIDER TO BE THE MAJOR THREATS FACING THEM AND IN WHAT ORDER OF DANGER DO THEY VIEW THESE THREATS?

### Issue IV: The Possibility of War with the Soviet Union

WHAT EVENTS OR CONDITIONS COULD LEAD THE SOVIETS TO INITIATE A WAR THAT COULD INVOLVE THE UNITED STATES?

HOW DO THE SOVIETS THINK A WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT START?

UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD THE SOVIETS CONSIDER  
MAKING A SURPRISE ATTACK ON OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR  
FORCES OR ON OUR FORCES IN NATO?

HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO TAKE  
STEPS THAT WOULD RISK WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES OR  
WITH CHINA?

DO SOVIET MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS EXPRESS THE  
SAME VIEW ON THESE ISSUES?

DO THE SOVIETS FEAR A U. S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SURPRISE  
ATTACK?

15 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [REDACTED] PB/NSC Coordination Staff

SUBJECT : Background Material for NFIB Discussion of the Soviet Brigade (U)

1. At the end of the NFIB meeting scheduled for 29 February, you will be discussing the paper prepared by NFAC in response to your questions about the state of the Community's analytical efforts on the brigade. The folder contains the material you wanted returned as background for that discussion (left side). I've also followed up on the two questions you posed for the [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] and I have also been very concerned about the numbers that NFAC has been using in connection with Soviets in Cuba. So we asked for NFAC's current breakdown (civilian and military) and this is also provided (following the DDO material). As the width of the ranges suggests, these numbers (with the exception of the brigade) are very soft. We think a priority effort should be made either to improve our confidence in these numbers or to make clear (via the PDB) that the best we can do is estimate ranges, that it is unlikely we will be able to come up with hard numbers over the next 6-8 months, that we expect [REDACTED]

Attachment



ORIGINAL CL BY [REDACTED]  
15 Feb 86